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The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee
Newsletter is a publication of the
Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network, an initiative of
the University of Maryland Francis
King Carey School of Law’s Law &
Health Care Program. The Newsletter
combines educational articles with
timely information about bioethics
activities. Each issue includes a feature
article, a Calendar of upcoming
events, and a case presentation and
commentary by local experts in
bioethics, law, medicine, nursing, or
related disciplines.
Diane E. Hoﬀmann, JD, MS - Editor

Clinicians, hospital ethics committee
members, and ethics consultants
generally embrace the aphorism:
“we must not ration at the bedside.”
Justiﬁcations for withholding or
withdrawing interventions that
prolong the life of a patient who
is not expected to survive hospital
discharge are generally grounded
in an autonomy-preserving or a
beneﬁt-burden analysis rather than
a resource allocation argument. One
reason for this is to avoid concerns
about conﬂict of interest, that is,
that ﬁnancial gain to the institution
or its staﬀ inﬂuenced the medical
decisions or recommendations made
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for a particular patient. However,
keeping stewardship and resource
allocation out of the discussion
about decision-making sometimes
violates logical reasoning, which
can create confusion. For example,
the motivation to justify withdrawal
or withholding of life support as
fulﬁlling a duty of nonmaleﬁcence
(i.e., not harming a dying patient by
continuing “aggressive” life support
or attempting cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation) is disingenuous if
the patient does not have suﬃcient
cognitive capacity to experience
harm (i.e., “to suﬀer”). Is this
phenomenon unique to the United
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States (US), where - outside the
Veterans Aﬀairs system—the
health care system operates on
principles of market competition
rather than government planning?
The case of Charlie Gard allows
for comparison, as Charlie was
born in the United Kingdom (UK)
and his health care was provided
through the UK’s National Health
Service (NHS). Charlie’s case
gained international recognition
after referral to the Family Division of UK’s High Court, where
after numerous appeals, justices
ultimately sided with doctors who
opined that Charlie’s condition (a
rare form of mitochondrial DNA
depletion syndrome, or “MDS”)
was incompatible with life. They
determined it was not in his best
interest to receive further treatment and recommended that he be
removed from life support while
receiving palliative care. Charlie’s
parents wanted to take him to the
US to try experimental treatment
with an oral drug thought to replace what Charlie’s body couldn’t
produce. Potential ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest was not at issue
here because neither the hospital
nor the staﬀ stood to gain ﬁnancially based on what happened to
Charlie. Also, money had been
raised through a GoFundMe campaign to cover the costs of travel
and the experimental treatment, so
there would be no cost to the NHS
(although the hospital was willing to implement the experimental
study protocol if they thought it
might have beneﬁtted Charlie).
Presumably, the justices’ decision
had nothing to do with the costs of
Charlie’s care.

regarding access to health care
services. Resource stewardship
and fair resource allocation are
integral components of the NHS,
so endorsement of these ideals by
health care providers and those
they serve generally engenders
broader public support. However,
the issue of distributive justice was
omitted from the court’s opinion.
Still, some weighing in on social
media were critical of the clinicians’ and justices’ motivations
in “depriving” Charlie of “hope
for a cure.” Interestingly, the US
researchers oﬀering to provide the
experimental therapy to Charlie
were not subjected to the same
level of distrust, despite standing
to gain ﬁnancially if Charlie had
been allowed to receive the experimental treatment they oﬀered.
Hammond-Browning reported:

Here, the UK has an advantage
over the US in that individuals
there are on more equal footing

Potential ﬁnancial conﬂicts such
as these and distributive justice issues such as Charlie occupying an

…[I]t became apparent that two
potential imperatives drive access
to treatment, the ﬁrst being the
best interests and the other, the
“experimental”/“ﬁnancial.” The
willingness of the U.S. doctor to
provide this experimental therapy
raises ethical questions of providing a treatment purely based on
the availability of funding. At some
point Charlie’s parents were allowed to believe that if they could
simply raise the money to travel
to the United States then their son
would have hope, whereas the
willingness to provide an untested
therapy on the sole basis of raising the required money should
have raised warning ﬂags and
prompted further questions around
anticipated outcomes. (HammondBrowning, 2017, p. 467)

ICU bed that could beneﬁt another
patient were not part of the debate.
Yet, Close and colleagues (2018)
believe that best interest decisions are inherently value-laden,
and there is danger in prioritizing one set of values (e.g., that it
is not in a child’s best interest to
be maintained on life support in
the face of impending death) over
others (e.g., that life is of value
regardless of a child’s prognosis).
Instead of distancing such cases
from discussion of fair distribution of health care resources, they
recommend that “[m]ore treatment limitation decisions could
be based on rationing, and there
would be less need to cloak rationing decisions as best interests
ones.” They propose quasi-judicial
multi-member tribunals (as is done
in other countries such as Australia) as alternatives to courts in
resolving conﬂicts such as what
treatments Charlie’s parents could
pursue for him.
Huxtable (2018) sees promise in
UK’s Clinical Ethics Network
(UKCEN) and regional clinical
ethics committees, as they are
quicker to issue their advice, less
costly, more inclusive, and less adversarial. Such committees could
perhaps do a better job than the
courts in acknowledging justice
concerns while examining relevant
facts and stakeholder perspectives.
Huxtable acknowledges, however,
that there is room for improvement. Such committees should see
their role as not just supporting
clinicians but also the public. They
would need to be independent
from the health care institution(s)
where they work, and more transparent about their operating procedures, how members are selected
and trained to ensure diversity and

competency, and how their services are evaluated and overseen.
Pope (2016) has studied “outlier”
cases and how they are handled
with regard to “futility” disputes.
He has long been an advocate of
regional ethics committees as a
compromise between the transparency/due process advantage
of courts and the eﬃciency of
hospital ethics committees in
resolving disagreements between
family members and clinicians
about when to withdraw nonbeneﬁcial medical interventions.
He argues that such committees
would provide an advantage over
hospital ethics committees and
courts, as long as they were properly composed (e.g., adequate
representation from the community and marginalized groups)
and thoughtful attention was paid
to procedural standards, transparency, and oversight.
Could a diﬀerent approach to
resolving the conﬂict between
Charlie’s parents and the medical
team have involved less stakeholder burden while preserving a
fair conﬂict resolution process?
It’s reported that ethics consultants met with Charlie’s parents,
yet the case still went to court.
The court proceedings took several months, and inﬂicted stress,
privacy violations, and cost burdens on the parties. Mr. Justice
Francis, the High Court judge
overseeing Charlie’s court case,
commented on the beneﬁts of
attempting alternative means of
dispute resolution in these kinds
of cases. He stated:
…[I]t is my clear view that mediation should be attempted in
all cases such as this one even if

all that it does is achieve a greater
understanding by the parties of
each other’s positions. Few users of the court system will be
in a greater state of turmoil and
grief than parents in the position
that these parents have been in
and anything which helps them to
understand the process and the
viewpoint of the other side, even if
they profoundly disagree with it,
would in my judgment be of beneﬁt
and I hope that some lessons can
therefore be taken from this tragic
case which it has been my duty to
oversee. (Public Law Today, 2017)
Indeed, there is tension between
the eﬃciency provided by members of an institutional ethics committee mediating conﬂicts in such
cases and the neutrality, transparency, and due process of a court. If
the conﬂict is primarily grounded
in stakeholder miscommunication, it makes sense to attempt
to address the miscommunication before turning to the court.
But many cases that go to court
(whether in the US or the UK) are
“outlier” cases, such as Charlie
Gard or Jahi McMath. If the question at issue is whether a patient’s
or surrogate’s demand for limited
resources is reasonable, such as
access to advanced life support, a
court is not best situated to address
this, and an institutional ethics
committee faces the challenge of
overcoming assertions of ﬁnancial
bias. Regional ethics committees
could present a preferable conﬂict
resolution process for such outlier
cases.
In the end, some of the same challenges facing institutional ethics
committees would be present in
regional ethics committees: deter
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mining who is competent to join,
training and engaging members
who are not compensated for
their services, attracting a diverse
membership (particularly community members, as well as medical
specialists), and implementing fair
and eﬃcient procedural standards
and oversight. But perhaps such a
committee could achieve “economies of scale” by helping individual institutions achieve, collectively, what is much more diﬃcult to
achieve individually: contribution
toward a fair process for handling
conﬂicts about medical treatment
rooted in a community standard of
medical care. This could be particularly useful when stewardship
of healthcare resources (such as an
ICU bed or advanced life support
technology) is at issue—even if
that is not the central issue.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
REFERENCES
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOW US AND
UK COURTS RESOLVE CASES
INVOLVING LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT

In “Ethics Committees vs. Courts
– A Role for Regional Ethics Committees in Addressing
Distributive Justice?,” Dr. Tarzian refers to the case of Charlie
Gard, the case that captured the
attention of the UK and many
in the US during the summer of
2017. The case was perplexing
for many American bioethicists
and health lawyers likely because
of some basic diﬀerences in the
foundational law that undergirds
similar cases in the US. For decision-making involving infants
and children, both courts in the
US and UK apply a best interest
test, as an infant or young child
innately lacks decision-making
capacity. However, UK and US
law diﬀer in who determines
what is in the child’s best interest.
In the US, the US Supreme Court
has determined that parents have
a constitutional right to privacy
regarding family matters. This

has been interpreted to mean that
they have protection from government intrusion into their decisionmaking regarding health care for
their children, absent a showing
of abuse or neglect or statutes
allowing a mature or emancipated
minor to make certain decisions
regarding their health. When
parents disagree about a medical
decision regarding their child, and
the case goes to court in the US,
the court will determine what is
in the child’s best interest. This
assessment generally includes the
beneﬁts and burdens of life with
and without the treatment at issue.
In the UK, parents have no right
to decide, but scholars have described the decision-making over
life-sustaining treatment in these
cases as a ‘joint decision’ between
the child’s parents and his or her
doctors (Close et al., 2018). When
the child’s physicians and parents

are unable to agree, the parents or
the hospital can apply to the courts
for a decision as to whether it is in
the child’s best interests to provide
life-sustaining therapy (Id.). In this
decision, the parents’ wishes are
“wholly irrelevant” to the objective best interest test except to the
extent they play into the “quality
and value to the child of the childparent relationship” (Mason &
Laurie, 2013, p. 515).
Law between the jurisdictions
also diﬀers in decision-making for
adults who lack decision-making
capacity. In the US, virtually all
states have adopted law through
statute or case law that allows
surrogate decision-making for an
adult patient who lacks decisionmaking capacity. Surrogates can
make decisions based ﬁrst on what
they believe the patient would
have wanted, i.e., the substituted
judgment test. If there is insuﬃcient evidence of what the patient
wanted, then the surrogate is to
base his or her decision on what
is in the patient’s “best interest.”
Best interest in most states is
deﬁned by common law, although
in Maryland it is spelled out in
the Health Care Decisions Act
(HCDA). Interestingly, in the UK,
the courts have not adopted a substituted judgment test, rather under
the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
at least in England and Wales,
the courts apply a modiﬁed best
interests test that takes into account some of the attributes of the
patient that might have aﬀected
his or her decision, i.e., the patient’s previous wishes, beliefs and
values. (This is actually similar to
the deﬁnition of best interests in
the HCDA.) Also, under the law
in the UK, the decision-maker is
not necessarily the patient’s family

member but is the “carer responsible for [their] day-to-day care,
or a professional such as a doctor, nurse or social worker where
decisions about treatment, care
arrangements or accommodation
need to be made.” (Mental Capacity Act 2005).
In both the UK and the US, the
courts in these types of decisions
do not generally consider the cost
of continued life-sustaining treatment or use of limited medical
resources for a patient. In the US,
such decisions are thought not
to be appropriate for the courts
as they do not have the requisite
knowledge about how health care
resources are being used, they
only have information about the
case before them. This type of
decision, most courts argue, is
more appropriate for a legislative
body that can collect the information necessary to make broader
resource allocation decisions. The
issue is a separation of powers
argument about the relative expertise and role of each branch of
government.
As the UK does not have a constitution and has no formal separation of powers doctrine, the argument does not apply to the same
extent, but “courts usually refuse
to intervene in resource allocation
decisions, because they recognize
they are poorly situated to make
these prioritization decisions in
the context of a single case” (Id.).
While UK courts do not generally
weigh in on the substantive issue
of resource allocation, they will
assess the decision-making process used by a health care institution to ensure that it is fair. Most
of the resource allocation questions come to courts in the UK

when a patient or parent alleges
that a health authority or institution has not allocated suﬃcient
resources to a patient or family
member. However, even in these
cases, there must be an explicit
rationing decision made by the
health authority that the court is
asked to review. There is nothing
comparable in the US as there is
no right to medical care, except a
limited right to emergency medical
treatment under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act. The closest analogy in
the US might be appeals of Medicare or Medicaid coverage denial
decisions in the context of health
care or the appeal of a school system decision under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), denying a student a free
and appropriate education, in the
context of education.
Upon reading about the Charlie
Gard case last summer, individuals
familiar with the law regarding
medical decision-making in the
US might have asked, why did the
Gard case go to court? In the US,
the parents could have simply
enrolled their child in a research
protocol without judicial approval.
But maybe not. British health law
experts explain that the case came
to court at the request of the health
care institution. The court was
asked to aﬃrm the medical decision that it was not in Charlie’s
best interest to be kept alive on the
ventilator but also whether it was
appropriate for Charlie to undergo
experimental therapy.
As to the ventilatory support and
experimental therapy, Justice
Francis, who heard the case, determined that there was virtually no
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 5

beneﬁt to either and that there
was the potential for pain and
suﬀering by exposing Charlie to
the experimental therapy. Therefore, he determined that neither
were in Charlie’s best interest and
that the hospital would be acting
within the law to remove Charlie
from the ventilator. In the US, it
is conceivable that if Charlie was
being cared for in a hospital and
the physicians were aware that
his parents were enrolling him
in an experimental protocol that
involved more than minimal risk,
they might have taken the case to
court arguing that such action was
medical abuse, but such an argument would be much more difﬁcult to make than whether or not
the action was in the child’s best
interest.
Diane Hoﬀmann, JD, MS
Jacob A. France Professor of Health Law
Director, L&HCP
University of Maryland School of Law

REFERENCES:
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Great Ormond Street Hospital v.
Gard, High Ct. of Justice, Family Division (April 11, 2017) and
(July 24, 2017).
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HARVARD REVISITS
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING DEATH

This year marks the 50-year anniversary of Harvard’s ad hoc committee report establishing neurologic criteria for death (what lead author
Henry Beecher termed “irreversible coma”). The report, published
in 1968, informed the model deﬁnition of death that the President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research developed in 1981 to address the
problem of variation in how states deﬁned death. This led to adoption
by all states (in some form) of the Uniform Determination of Death
Act (UDDA), which deﬁnes death as occurring after “irreversible
cessation of circulatory or respiratory functions” or “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem”
(UDDA, 2008).
Last April, Harvard convened experts to revisit criteria for determining death. Recent cases such as that of Jahi McMath have raised various questions and concerns, as summarized below.
UDDA WORDING
All functions of the entire brain. The UDDA speciﬁes that death occurs when “all functions of the entire brain” irreversibly stop. Since
then, we have seen cases of people declared dead based on neurologic
criteria whose bodies have been preserved with ventilator support and
nutrition/hydration via gastrostomy tube. We now know that a body
can reach a kind of homeostasis after the brain ceases to function such
that, with ventilatory support, the lungs, heart, kidneys, and liver can
still function, and the gut can process tube-fed nutrients. Most neurologists and bioethicists have considered these bodily functions—absent a functioning brain—as insuﬃcient for human existence, since

the brain is the integrating center
and without it, a human cannot
meaningfully exist in this world.
However, the fact that McMath
reportedly began menstruating
after being declared brain dead has
led others to conclude that part of
her hypothalamus, which supports
pituitary function, may have been
functioning. If this were scientiﬁcally corroborated, then McMath
would not have met the UDDA
criteria for death, which requires
that “all functions of the entire
brain” have irreversibly ceased.
Some have advocated for changing the wording in the UDDA to
specify which functions of the
brain must have permanently
stopped, and to clarify which
diagnostic tests would conﬁrm
this. Lawyer and futility blogger
Thaddeus Pope predicts that more
cases like these will challenge the
discrepancies between the UDDA’s standard and the American
Academy of Neurology (AAN)
criteria.
Irreversible cessation of circulatory function. Given advances
in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) since Harvard’s 1968
report, it’s not surprising that
the UDDA may be outdated in
its language. Some have argued
that the term “irreversible” be
replaced with “permanent” when
referencing circulatory function,
since some individuals who die by
circulatory death could have their
heart beat and circulation restarted
but have opted for a “Do-NotAttempt Resuscitation” (DNAR)
order. In this case, circulatory
function is permanently ceased because the DNAR order precludes
attempts to restart the heart (that
is, the stopping of the heart

may be reversible but since the decision was previously made not to
try to restart it, its stopping is thus
permanent). The question of what
deﬁnes “permanent” circulatory
cessation can be further nuanced
in situations of organ donation
after cardiac death (when an “arbitrary” time is established after the
heart stops to declare death before
organs are procured), and when
patients are on cardiac bypass,
such as extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation (ECMO). ECMOCPR, implemented in some locales
such as France, is highlighting the
complexity of establishing a speciﬁc time of death. Seema Shah,
Associate Professor in the Division of Bioethics at the University
of Washington School of Medicine, proposes that the UDDA’s
deﬁnition of death be considered
as a “legal ﬁction,” much like
blindness (i.e., one doesn’t have to
be completely blind to be considered “legally blind”).
CONFIRMING DEATH BY
NEUROLOGIC CRITERIA
Which tests are conﬁrmatory?
The UDDA establishes neurologic
criteria for death as requiring the
following over a 24-hour period,
absent certain medications or
conditions that could confound the
testing:
• No response to stimuli
• No spontaneous movement
or breathing
• No reﬂexes
However, the UDDA does not
specify which tests must be done.
It defers to “accepted medical
standards” for conﬁrming these
criteria are met. A neurologic
exam involves checking for absent

reﬂexes and conﬁrming that no
spontaneous respirations have
occurred over a period of time
(typically, ten minutes). Other
ancillary tests may be done if
needed (e.g., an electroencephalogram or cerebral angiogram).
Some wonder whether other tests
should be considered or developed
that would reduce ambiguity or
uncertainty, such as giving intravenous atropine to see if heart rate
increases, or more precise types of
blood ﬂow studies.
Variable practices. Many point out
that clinical practice varies from
state to state and institution to
institution. Greer and colleagues
(2008) found major diﬀerences in
brain death guidelines among the
leading neurologic hospitals in the
US, concluding that adherence to
the AAN guidelines for determining death by neurologic criteria
is inconsistent. Some wonder if
having diﬀerent guidelines for
adults and children may add to the
variable approaches. The AAN’s
guidelines for adults can be found
at https://www.aan.com/Guidelines/home/GuidelineDetail/431.
The Pediatric Section of the Society of Critical Care Medicine’s (PSCCM’s) guidelines for children
and infants are available at https://
www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/
socc_pediatric_bd_guideline_tool.
pdf.
Consent & refusal for apnea
testing. Some clinicians, such as
neurologist Alan Shewmon, have
concluded that apnea testing to
conﬁrm neurologic death is unethical, as it may harm patients
who retain some brain function.
Others believe that clinicians
should get consent to perform the
apnea test. There is a small but
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 7

growing number of cases in which
surrogates have refused to allow
clinicians to perform an apnea test,
thus precluding the declaration of
death via neurologic criteria (since
the apnea test is typically the
last step before death is declared
via neurologic criteria). Nevada
recently passed a bill recognizing
that the determination of death is a
clinical decision made by a doctor in accordance with AAN’s and
P-SCCM’s guidelines, and that
surrogate consent is not required.
However—Shewmon’s position
notwithstanding—others have
suggested that physicians explain
implications of the apnea test by
providing a kind of “informed
non-dissent” with the surrogate
such that objectors could decline.
In those cases, death would not be
declared, but presumably, it would
come eventually, for example,
after a determination that further
treatment was non-beneﬁcial,
since the patient could not survive
outside of the intensive care unit.
In 1968, Henry Beecher referred to
brain death as “irreversible coma.”
Indeed, some believe those with
higher brain function loss, such as
Terri Schiavo, could be considered
dead. Robert Veatch suggested that
individuals be able to declare in
an advance directive whether they
considered themselves dead based
on permanent whole brain, higher
brain, or circulatory function loss.
This would allow for organs to be
procured in a way that respects
individual variation in when they
consider a person dead. In 2018,
Robert Truog, Director of the
Harvard Center for Bioethics,
referred to Jahi McMath as being
in a state of “irreversible apneic
unconsciousness,” which evokes
Beecher’s reference. Truog chal8 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

lenged the mainstream consensus
that the UDDA’s deﬁnition of
death is “good enough.” Time will
tell whether we stick with the status quo and if not, what changes
are on the horizon.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
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MHECN ESTABLISHES ADVISORY BOARD
On July 2, 2018, MHECN staﬀ
held a roundtable on the future of
the Network to which they invited
twenty ethics committee representatives and thought leaders in the
areas of bioethics, health policy
and bioethics-related legal issues. At the roundtable, attendees
explored the following questions:
1) is the Network continuing to
provide members with valuable
information and services; and 2)
are there other types of initiatives
or services that the Network could
provide that would assist members
in addressing ethical issues that
arise in their institutions. Participants heard presentations from
Diane Hoﬀmann, who convened
the meeting, about the history of
the Network and activities and
initiatives it has undertaken ranging from delivering educational
programs and providing information (e.g., The Mid-Atlantic Ethics
Committee Newsletter to engaging
in research on such issues as the
competency of ethics committee
members, the views of ICU physicians and hospital legal counsel on
the medically ineﬀective treatment
provisions in the Health Care Decisions Act; and the implementa

tion of the Maryland Orders
for Life Sustaining Procedures
Act. They also heard from Anita
Tarzian, Coordinator of the Network, about what is happening
at the national level with ethics
committees, in particular efforts by the American Society of
Bioethics in Healthcare (ASBH)
to establish standards for clinical ethics consultation, and from
Paul Ballard of the Maryland
Oﬃce of the Attorney General,
about initiatives of the State Advisory Council on Quality Care at
the End of Life. These presentations were followed by comments
from Cynda Rushton, Professor
of Clinical Ethics, at the Berman
Institute of Bioethics and School
of Nursing at Johns Hopkins
University; David Moller, Director of Health Care Ethics, Anne
Arundel Medical Center; and
Evan DeRenzo, Assistant Director, John J. Lynch, MD Center
for Ethics, MedStar Washington
Hospital Center. Each spoke
about some of the programs and
issues their committee had taken
on or were struggling with. The
remainder of the roundtable was
spent hearing from each of the

attendees regarding their thoughts
about the future of the Network.
An outgrowth of the roundtable
was the establishment of an
Advisory Board for the Network
to keep it current and make
sure that it is providing a useful
forum and services to its member institutions. Members of the
Board include: Cynda Rushton
(Johns Hopkins Hospital), Evan
DeRenzo (MedStar Washington Hospital Center), David
Moller (Anne Arundel Medical
Center), Frederick Weinstein,
Yoram Unguru (Sinai Hospital),
Jack Schwartz (formerly with
Maryland Oﬃce of the Attorney
General), Jessica Schram (Living
Legacy Foundation), Lee Schwab
(Holy Cross Hospital), Wayne
Brannock (Lorien Health Services), Marion Danis (NIH), Karen
Rothenberg (University of Maryland School of Law), Shahid Aziz
(formerly with Harbor Hospital),
Dan Kleiner (Kennedy Kreiger),
Jackie Dinterman (Frederick
Regional Health Systems), and
Henry Silverman (University of
Maryland Medical Center). The
ﬁrst meeting of the Advisory
Board was on October 1, 2018.
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ASBH OFFERS FIRST CERTIFICATION EXAM FOR
ETHICS CONSULTANTS
On June 10, 2018, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) opened its application cycle
for certiﬁcation to practice clinical healthcare ethics consulting. Those who demonstrate the requisite practice
experience and pass the certiﬁcation exam will earn the HEC-C credential. The HEC-C program assesses core
knowledge and skills in clinical healthcare ethics consulting. Eligible applicants are those who have a Bachelor’s Degree (minimum) and at least 400 hours of healthcare ethics experience within the previous four years.
The exam is administered during two, month-long test windows between November 1-30, 2018, and May 1-31,
2019. The application deadline date for the November testing window was September 10, and the application
deadline date for the May testing window is March 10. The exam fee is $450 for ASBH members and $650 for
non-members. To view the content outline for the exam with examples and to download an application, visit
http://www.asbh.org.
CORE REFERENCES FOR THE HCE-C EXAM
Applebaum, P. S. (2007). Clinical practice. Assessment of patients’ competence to consent to treatment. New
England Journal of Medicine, 357(18), 1834-1840.
Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (2012). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Berlinger, N., Jennings, B., & Wolf, S. (2013). The Hastings Center Guidelines for Decisions on Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care Near the End of Life. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Core Competencies Task Force (2011). Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation (2nd ed.).
Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities.
Clinical Ethics Consultation Aﬀairs Committee. (2017). Addressing Patient-Centered Ethical Issues in Health
Care: A Case-Based Study Guide. Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities.
Clinical Ethics Consultation Aﬀairs Committee. (2015). Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consultation: An Education Guide (2nd ed.) Chicago, IL: American Society of Bioethics and Humanities.
Diekema, D., Mercurio, M., & Adam M (Eds). (2011). Clinical Ethics in Pediatrics: A Case-Based Textbook.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Dubler, N., & Liebman, C. (2011). Bioethics Mediation: A Guide to Shaping Shared Solutions.Nashville, TN.:
Vanderbilt University Press.
Fletcher, J., Lombardo, P., & Spencer, E. (2005). Fletcher's Introduction to Clinical Ethics (3rd ed.). Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group.
Ford, P. & Dudzinski, D. (Eds.). (2008). Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases That Haunt Us. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Hester, D.N. & Schonfeld, T. (2012). Guidance for Healthcare Ethics Committees. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Jonsen, A., Siegler, M., & Winslade, W. (2015). Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in
Clinical Medicine (8th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Kon AA, Shepard, E. K., Sederstrom, N. O., Swoboda, S. M., Marshall, M. F., Birriel, B., & Rincon, F. (2016).
Deﬁning futile and potentially inappropriate interventions: A policy statement from the Society of Critical Care
Medicine Ethics Committee. Critical Care Medicine, 44(9), 1769-1774.
Lo, B. (2013). Resolving Ethical Dilemmas: A Guide for Clinicians (5th ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams
& Wilkins.
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect conﬁdentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.

CASE STUDY: When
Physicians Lose Their
Tempers: Apologizing and
Moving Forward in the
Care of a Dying Patient
The following case and ﬁrst
commentary are reprinted with
permission from the Journal of
Hospital Ethics, 2015, Volume 4,
Issue 1, 33-34.
Mrs. C. is a 76-year-old woman
brought to the hospital’s Emergency Department (ED) after
a sudden, unwitnessed cardiac
arrest. EMS was called after
she was found by her neighbors
and they were unclear as to how
long she had been down. Mrs.
C. received extensive cardiopulmonary resuscitation lasting
over 40 minutes in the ED before
establishing a stable cardiac
rhythm suﬃcient for transfer to
the cardiac intensive care unit
(CICU).
After her admission to the CICU,
the neurology team assessed the
patient, concluding that she had
suﬀered signiﬁcant and likely
irreversible neurological damage caused by her cardiac arrest.
Both neurology and the CICU
teams have determined that the
patient has very little chance
at any meaningful neurologic
recovery and that her general

prognosis is poor. Mrs. C. has 4
adult children and a very involved
son-in-law, but does not have an
Advance Directive of any kind. Her
family and the CICU team have
been meeting regularly to discuss
her circumstances and determine
appropriate goals of care. These
discussions have gone on for more
than a week. The CICU attending
physician has explained at
each meeting that the patient’s
neurological condition has not
changed, that she is hemodynamically stable, and so it will be up to
the children whether or not they
want the patient to receive a tracheostomy and percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (trach and peg)
and be moved to a nursing home,
or whether they want to shift to
comfort measures only.
As the patient’s care moves into
the second week, Dr. W., the CICU
attending physician who has been
present at several of the previous family meetings, has grown
increasingly frustrated as a result
of the children’s inability to decide what direction they want to
take with their mother. It has been
Dr. W.’s training that he is to lay
out the options and let the family
decide. But he has grown frustrated
with their indecision and walks
out of the next meeting throwing
his hands in the air, declaring, “I
don’t care what they want, as long
as they make a decision!” Both

family and medical team members
who witnessed the display are left
in various degrees of shock, confusion, and anger. Ethics is consulted
in order to address the resulting
tensions and distress.
CHART NOTE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Dr. W. and the clinical ethicist
should meet with the family so that
Dr. W. can oﬀer an apology
for his frustration.
2. Dr. W. should make a clear recommendation about what he thinks
would be best for Mrs. C. and why
he thinks this would be the best approach to her future care.
REASONING
The attending physician has demonstrated an impulsive lack of
appropriate professional demeanor
and regard for the sensitive nature
of the matters under discussion.
His voiced frustration has resulted
in additional distress to the family
and the rest of the clinical team.
After calming down and reﬂecting,
Dr. W. tells the ethics consultant he
regrets having blown up. He tells
the consultant that his frustration
comes not only from the family’s
indecision, but from the way in
which he feels he has been trained
and professionally conditioned to
refrain in such circumstances from
oﬀering his own recommendation;
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that he’s just to lay out the options
and let the family choose (Hutchinson & Veatch, 2015).
Frustration is no excuse when an
emotional reaction gets the better
of a clinician’s behavior. When this
happens, however, clinicians need
to acknowledge that they’ve lost
their temper and be sure to genuinely apologize. We’ve learned that
a sincerely felt and given apology
from a physician for a medical error goes a long way to reduce the
distress physician mistakes cause to
patients and families (Robbennolt,
2009).
There is no reason to think that
an honest apology for losing
one’s temper can’t have the same
beneﬁcial eﬀects. One particular
potential outcome, the building
of trust, is particularly important
here. Combining renewed trust and
having the physician give a clear
recommendation may help move
the family forward. Separating Dr.
W.’s frustrated outburst from the
content of his remarks indicates
that he has come to these meetings with an appropriate impartiality towards the outcome. When a
patient is unstable and imminently
dying, physicians should only oﬀer
indicated interventions. If patients
or families ask for interventions
that are not indicated on the basis of well-established standards
of practice, ordinarily physicians
should not provide such interventions (Bosslet, et al., 2015).
Where conﬂicts continue, transfer
should be facilitated to the greatest degree medically feasible. But
where a hospitalized patient, even
a dying hospitalized patient, can be
made stable to discharge, Dr. W.
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appears to be rightly coming to
the decision-making from a position impartial towards the outcome.
That does not mean, however,
that a physician ought not give a
recommendation. Although this is
a controversial point, we take the
position that after presenting all
medical options within reason, it
remains the physician’s responsibility to make a recommendation.
Often this can help a family come
to their own decision, whether in
agreement with the physician or
not. If, under these conditions, the
family cannot come to a decision,
it is incumbent on the physician to
move to sustain the patient’s life
and ready the patient for discharge.
If the physician and other clinicians
can do this in a supportive rather
than frustrated manner, whatever
the decision, the hospital experience is likely to be less distressing
for everyone.
The Editorial Group of the Center
for Ethics, MedStar Washington
Hospital Center, Washington, DC
REFERENCES
Bosslet, G.T., Pope, T.M., Rubenfeld, G.D., et al. (2015). An oﬃcial
ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM
policy statement: Responding to
requests for potentially inappropriate treatments in Intensive Care
Units. Am J Respir Crit Care Med,
191(11), 1318-133.
Hutchinson, P.J. & Veatch, R.M.
(2015). Do physicians have a responsibility to provide recommendations regarding goals of care to
surrogates of dying patients in the
ICU? Point/Counterpoint. Chest,
147(6), 1453-1459.
Robbennolt, J.K. (2009). Apologies and medical error. Clin Orthop
Relat Res. 467(2), 376-382.

COMMENTS FROM AN
ETHICS CONSULTANT
Some form of communication
breakdown is present in most ethics
case consultations. This case was
prompted by an unfortunate incident in which the CICU attending
physician failed to navigate the patient’s care in a way that conveyed
compassion and a clear direction
to stakeholders. Ethics consultants
are likely familiar with scenarios
in which the medical team reports
having repeatedly attempted to
achieve consensus with family
members on appropriate goals of
care for an incapacitated patient but
have been unsuccessful in achieving such consensus. Sometimes,
best eﬀorts were implemented to
no avail. Often, however, the quality of the communication preceding
the request for ethics consultation
has been deﬁcient. In this case,
Dr. W.’s outburst is indicative of
a clear breach in communication
standards. How should the responding ethics consultant (or consultants – the plural “consultant” is
used here for simplicity) respond to
this breach of professional ethics?
The obvious step of gathering
relevant facts in this case may be
additionally challenged by the
breakdown in trust (and perhaps
medical team rapport) that resulted
from Dr. W.’s inappropriate behavior. Wicks and Buck (2013) point
out the importance of health care
leaders modeling best practices for
cultivating resilience, which they
refer to as more than “bouncing
back from stress” (p. 6) but “both
recovering and deepening as a consequence of encountering stress in
the right way with adequate inner

strength” (p. 7). They identify
“becoming easily upset” as one red
ﬂag of possible burnout. Thus, one
role for the ethics consultant may
be to speak privately with Dr. W. to
understand what prompted his frustration and if he has insight into his
inability to regulate his emotional
reaction in front of family and
staﬀ. If this is a recurring pattern
with this particular provider, other
interventions may be appropriate as
a method of follow-up.
Shapiro and colleagues (2014)
created the Center for Professionalism and Peer Support at Brigham
and Women’s Hospital in Boston to
educate staﬀ about professionalism
and to manage unprofessional behavior. They report that mandatory
education sessions on professional
development successfully engaged
clinicians in developing a culture
of “enhanced professionalism.” In
particular, they have developed a
process for responding to clinicians
exhibiting repetitive unprofessional
behavior that demonstrates successful outcomes in altering such
behavior.

While ethics consultants can do
their best to avoid taking sides in
their eﬀorts to reconstruct relevant perspectives, they should not
be put in a position of enabling or
apologizing for another provider’s
unprofessional conduct.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator

REFERENCES
Shapiro, J., Whittemore, A., &
Tsen, L.C. (2014). Instituting a
culture of professionalism: the
establishment of a center for
professionalism and peer support.
The Joint Commission Journal on
Quality & Patient Safety, 20(4),
168-77.
Wicks, R.J. & Buck, T.C. (2013).
Riding the dragon: Enhancing
resilient leadership and sensible
self-care in the healthcare executive. Frontiers in Health Services
Management, 30(2), 3-13.

Whether Dr. W.’s outburst was an
isolated incident or a pattern of
unprofessional conduct, he should
be steered in the right direction to
correct his missteps. In this case, it
would be appropriate for the ethics
consultant to coach Dr. W. in how
to make amends and redirect attention toward doing what’s right for
the patient. If Dr. W. would not be
open to such an intervention, that
says something about the organizational culture.
It’s not uncommon for patients or
family members to vent frustrations
about members of the health care
team to ethics consultants.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
Fall 2018

OCTOBER
8-10
Aspen Ethical Leadership Program for Healthcare. Visit: http://www.aspenethicalleadership.com.
11
A Live Online Workshop on Disclosure and Apology after Medical Errors and Adverse Events.
Visit: http://ipepweb.org/disclosure-and-apology.
16
The 3rd Annual Ethics Symposium: Conscientious Objection, sponsored by the Clinical Ethics Department at
Children's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. Visit: www.childrensmn.org/conferences.
16-17
Pediatric ELNEC (End-of-Life Nursing Education Consortium), sponsored by the University of Maryland
Children’s Hospital, 110 S. Paca St., Baltimore, MD. Contact: professionaldevelopment@umm.edu; 410-3286257.
17-18
ELNEC (End-of-Life Nursing Education Consortium) for Veterans, sponsored by Stella Maris, 2300 Dulaney
Valley Rd, Timonium, MD. Visit: https://www.stellamaris.org/news/events.
18-21
The Future is Now: 20th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Anaheim,
CA. Visit: http://www.asbh.org.
NOVEMBER
2-5
The 14th Biannual Clinical Ethics Immersion, Center for Ethics at MedStar Washington Hospital Center,
Washington, DC. Visit: https://www.medstarwashington.org/our-hospital/center-for-ethics/clinical-ethics.
8
5th Annual Interprofessional, Interfaith Ethics Forum: Exploring Mental Health from a Trauma-Informed
Care Lens, SMC Campus Center, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD (Co-sponsored by MHECN –
DISCOUNT for MHECN members).
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RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series, either at Feinstone Hall, E2030,
Bloomberg School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) or JH Technology Ventures (1812 Ashland Ave),
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/seminarseries.
October 8: “Bioethics, Pain Medicine, and America’s Opioid Crisis,” Travis Rieder, PhD, Director
of the Master of Bioethics degree program and Research Scholar, Berman Institute of Bioethics (JH
Technology Ventures)
October 29: “Opportunity Pluralism and Children’s Health,” Matteo Bonotti, Lecturer, Department of
Politics and International Relations, Monash University (Feinstone)
November 12: “Marked Men: In Case You Don’t Know About Tuskegee,” Peter Buxton (Feinstone)
November 26: “Moral Distress: A Time for Hope?” Alisa Carse, PhD, Associate Professor of
Philosophy, Kennedy Institute of Ethics (Feinstone)
December 10: “Incidental Enhancements: The Challenge of Prevention for Human Gene Editing
Governance,” Eric Juengst, PhD, Director, Center for Bioethics, University of North Carolina
(Feinstone)

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law
and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to
facilitate and enhance ethical reﬂection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing
informational and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The
Network attempts to achieve this goal by:
•

Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they
strive to assist their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;

•

Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;

•

Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the
general public on ethical issues in health care; and

•

Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.

MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from aﬃliate
members who provide additional ﬁnancial support.
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